
This study of Kant’s first *Critique* is astounding in its originality. Wayne Waxman rightly asks readers “to unlearn virtually everything they think they know about the doctrines of the Transcendental Analytic and their role in the critical philosophy as a whole” (viii). Extending his previous work on Kant—Waxman’s (1991) first book was focused more on Kantian imagination—the present book turns on a radically “New Understanding of Understanding” (from the title of chap. 5).

Understanding is still the faculty of *apperception*. But it is no longer inherently *discursive*, defined in terms of representation by way of concepts. This also opens the way to a new understanding of sensibility. To begin, the purely “sensible” unity of space and time is a nondiscursive synthetic unity of apperception. The book follows Kant’s elevation of this unity, by way of four further manifestations of unity of apperception (see, by way of comparison, 451), to an eventual *objective* unity of space and time as such, and finally to objective nature as a real “community of substances” (chap. 18, “Our Place in Nature and Its Place in Us”). It is only at the penultimate level that the famous Kantian “categories” enter in. But before that, Waxman makes powerful and original use of a notion much less in focus for commentators on Kant: analytic unity of apperception.

Part 1 is introductory but can also be regarded as corresponding to the *Critique*’s introduction. In addition to adumbrating Waxman’s reading of Kant’s “debt” to Hume in terms of a joint commitment to “sensibilist psychologism,” it is centered on Kant’s notion of the *a priori* and the analytic/synthetic distinction. The remaining four main parts focus on Kant’s “psychologistic explications of the possibility and forms of sensibility in the Transcendental Aesthetic, of thought in the Metaphysical Deduction and of cognizable objects in the Transcendental Deduction, and of nature in the Transcendental Schematism and Principles. Waxman concludes with a critique of contemporary philosophy of mind, and the sciences of mind, for failure to appreciate the potential of the Cartesian *cogito*, once “assessed in Kant’s more rigorously analyzed form, freed from all of the excess epistemological and metaphysical baggage with which Descartes and his successors, both empiricist and rationalist, encumbered it” (557).

In part 2, chapters 3–5 offer a compelling case, from the ground of the Aesthetic itself, for Kant’s *need* to say that, independently of discursivity, pure space and time presuppose synthetic unity of apperception. Chapter 4 also offers an original approach to the relationship between time and space, and

1. And so in fulfillment of the promissory note of Waxman (2005).
chapter 5 provides a useful guide to the upcoming study of the Analytic and—
chapters 3–4 having ranged widely throughout Kant’s writings but postponed
evidence from the Transcendental Deduction—an overview of supporting texts
from the Deduction. Chapter 6 deals with mathematics, including the interesting “Is Mathematical Logic Mathematics or Logic?” (Answer: mathematics; see,
by way of comparison, the later criticism of MacFarlane’s distinction between
Kantian and Fregean conceptions of logic, 398ff.) Chapters 7–8 deal with real-
ism and idealism, with a novel “Kantian Refutation of Berkeley’s Idealism”
(chap. 8).

Beyond equating the purely “aesthetic” unity of space and time with a
nondiscursive unity of apperception, what is most striking is Waxman’s con-
clusion that this still leaves us with no more than a manifold “devoid of all
differentiation and determination” (116)—to the extent that, for space, not
only does it “not need to conform to the definitions, axioms, postulates, and
theorems of Euclidean or any other geometry, or indeed to any mathematical or
physical system whatsoever . . . [but] no order, no connectedness, no parts mak-
ing up wholes, no space objectively and determinately above or below . . . just
sheer, purely aesthetic spatial outsideness (juxtaposition) as such” (117–18).

Waxman’s view of the radical indeterminateness of aesthetic space and
time follows from his reading of Kant’s attempt to deal, without leaving the level
of sensibility itself, with the problem of how little is provided by sensation. Thus
beyond (a) a bare “synopsis” of sensations (so called at A94, 97), as a manifold of
affections of a perceiver, two things are yet needed for so much as what might be
called a field of appearance within which any determinate content might be dis-
riminated: (b) imaginative synthesis of apprehension (likewise not explicitly in
view until the Analytic, A97) and (c) whatever unity of apperception of the
imaginative synthesis in (b) is required, together with the synopsis in (a), for
so much as the bare availability of such a field. Waxman is indeed striking in his
emphasis on the need for a wholly prediscursive “super-field” (97), differences
in the “matter” of which “correspond to” (or, in Waxman’s terms, “exhibit”) the
heterogeneous synopsized affections of distinct sense modalities as the homo-
geneous manifold of a single intuition, that is, a synthetic unity of sensibility.2

So far, what we might be said to have is the minimum possible sense of a
consciousness able to scan or survey within such a field, sufficient for it to be a
field for that consciousness. (Perhaps needless to say: this is not the claim that
there is, either in advance or afterward, any sort of “field” of mere affections.) And
so it must indeed involve some level of apperception. But again, nothing so far
requires any sense of the possibility of proceeding through a manifold of dis-

2. This is to be distinguished from what Waxman himself calls “the heterogeneity
problem” posed by the problem of uniting the sensible and the discursively intellectual in
cognition without succumbing to transcendental “amphiboly”: either intellectualizing
the former or sensibilizing the latter.
tinct, determinate places or times. The former is left to discursive understanding in its categorial differentiation and determination of the manifold precisely as a manifold of pure intuition. The a priori “form of appearance”—constituted by the conjunction of (b) and (c) with the synopsis of sensations—is only part of what makes this possible, that is, possible “to intuit appearances ... as the purely formal manifold of a pure intuition” (90)—still quite apart from any concern with a manifold of empirical reality.

The next problem is, of course, to consider how, at work with its categories, discursive understanding might rise to the demand for differentiation and determination of such a wholly indeterminate manifold. And this is indeed the central problem for Waxman. For there is “a radical heterogeneity between sensibility and categorial understanding that seems to preclude the very determinations of sensibility by understanding required for Kant to solve the problems he sought to address in the Transcendental Analytic” (153–54). The key to Waxman’s eventual reconstruction of Kant’s solution—found in chapter 15 of part 4, the only chapter “that is more a supplement to Kant’s text than an exposition” (12)—will lie in original analytic unity of apperception (AUA), which Kant tells us likewise presupposes an original but prediscursive synthetic unity (B131–34; see 241ff.). AUA will in any case be well positioned to offer such a key. For while it is, like categorial unity, a form of discursive unity, it is still preconceptual and so precategorical: “if apperception were essentially categorial, the heterogeneity problem would be insoluble ... it is only if, and insofar as, apperception has pre-discursive and pre-categorial guises that the determination of the sensible by categorial understanding is possible” (154).

The reason AUA is discursive but still preconceptual is that it is what makes any concept a concept in the first place, that is, gives it the form of logical generality. Waxman introduces the notion in the first chapter of part 3, chapter 9 (“Concepts in Mind”), which deals with the pure form of a concept as such. In chapter 10, he then provides an impressive defense of the logical “table of judgments” in its own right, with the help of a sharp distinction between purely mental combinations of “AUA-universals” in judgments (and combinations of such judgments)—that is, combinations of universals precisely insofar as they are constituted by AUA—and any sorts of linguistic structures.

Kant himself introduces AUA in connection with the I in the I think, necessarily duplicable throughout the representations possible for a subject. But in a note (B133–34n), by reference to the concept red, he says that it “attaches to (hängt ... an) all common concepts as such” and indeed makes a representation (here apparently a sensation of red) into a concept (zum conceptus communis macht). Again, this is the second (the first discursive) level of expression of unity of apperception. The third—yet still not presupposing the categories—is the unity of the “judging subject” with respect to all concepts possible for it, grounded in the logical functions for combining concepts (and judgments) into judgments (chap. 10; see, by way of comparison, 153, 451). This
is, of course, not to say that the *I think* or the *I* therein is a concept. Rather, their analytic unity constitutes the form of universality attaching to concepts as such (252). Thus, as concepts, the categories presuppose AUA, and so they cannot be involved in the constitution of the original *synthetic* unity of apperception necessarily “antecedently conceived” relative to AUA (B132–34, incl. notes). Thus Waxman reasonably argues (245–47) that this presupposed *synthetic* unity must be not only precategorial but also prediscursive, and so none other than the original synthetic unity of pure intuition described by Kant at B136n. Thus, we have a second route to Kantian “sensibilism,” the view that “no purely intellectual representational content is possible because (pure and/or empirical) contributions from sensibility are essential to the constitution of everything we mentally represent” (6): here back from logic itself, in addition to that looking ahead from the Aesthetic.

In chapter 11, on the Metaphysical Deduction, Waxman takes his lead from the *Critique*’s single example of “derivation” of a category (B128–29) from a logical function of judgment, that of *substance*, and painstakingly works out a parallel for all the derivations. Here, he emphasizes what is generally taken less seriously than Kant intended it. What Kant himself says is that the whole content of the concept *substance* relates directly only to other possible concepts: in this case, its application in judgment restricting one of the concepts in that judgment, otherwise indifferently suited for either subject- or predicate-position, solely to a subject-position in judgments. This, of course, only intensifies our problem. The categories as such relate directly to other concepts; concepts as such seem radically heterogeneous to what is so wholly indeterminate and devoid of logical form as the manifold to which, by the argument of the Transcendental Deduction (chapters 12–14 in part 4), the categories are required to bring objective determination.

It is in part 4, at the fourth level of the expression of unity of apperception—that of the categories’ purely intellectual synthesis and its “extension” to the manifold of formally intuited pure space and time by transcendental *synthesis speciosa* (451)—that Waxman offers an ingenious account of the categories’ ability to rise to the demand imposed by the Transcendental Deduction. The exotic sounding synthesis in question—“figurative synthesis” as introduced in section 24 of the B-edition Transcendental Deduction—is aimed at dealing with the question as to how purely intellectual cognitive functions are (if they are in fact) able to enter into the fabric of experience itself. A common view of the matter is that they do so at most to the extent that “experience” is regarded as a kind of *conjunction*, one conjunct of which is simply intellectually “responsive”—but perhaps also, of course, as argued by Kant, in its own way a priori “legislative”—with respect to the other, purely sensible conjunct. But for Waxman’s Kant, and it seems to me rightly, central to Kant’s originality is that the functions of purely intellectual synthesis can and do indeed enter more literally *into* what sensibility has to offer.
The demand, again, is to elevate the prediscursive unity of space and time to the objective unity implicit in a universal relational network for the location of appearances. One might think that this is supposed to occur on the level of “schematization” of the categories. But Waxman convincingly argues (chaps. 15-A and 16) that subsumption of appearances under transcendental schemata is itself an extension—finally at the fifth level of the expression of unity of apperception—to the manifold of empirical-material intuition of the objective unity independently established with respect to spaces and times as such. Here, therefore, especially noteworthy is his reading (chap. 14) of the move to objective unity of apperception in the B-Deduction’s section 19, and of the “necessity” there introduced by the categories, as not yet involving objects specifically as things even conceivably in spaces and times. Also noteworthy in Waxman’s general discussion of the Deduction (chap. 12) is his challenge to the standard reading of Kant’s distinction between questions quid juris and quid facti.

But again: how does it even make sense to talk about “extending” the purely intellectual synthesis of the categories to the purely aesthetic spatiotemporal manifold? It is here (chap. 15) that Waxman puts AUA to dramatic use. What permits this is the fact that, while Kant’s introduction of the latter does not explicitly speak of the possibility of attaching AUA to just any representation, so as to convert it into a concept, his own example is apparently a mere sensation. Nothing in principle, then, presumably excludes that the target for conversion “can be an empirical intuition, a pure intuition, a sensation, a desire, a passion.” (251). Pure intuition is, of course, our concern: “Nothing more is required to represent the entire, inexhaustibly infinite manifold of juxtaposed and successive intuitions apprehensible in pure space and time through a manifold of equally many concepts of juxtaposition and succession available for categorial determination than to represent ... original analytic unity ... as attaching to each and every such intuition a priori” (411). Thus for the synthesis speciosa of the categories substance-accident:

By attaching the analytic unity of apperception to this manifold, its representation is converted into the representation of an equally inexhaustible infinity of concepts of these appearances and their juxtaposition or succession with each and every other (chap. 9-C). Utilizing the logical form of categorical judgment to represent each of these (concepts of) appearances as subject and (the concepts of) their juxtaposition or succession with some other appearance as predicate ... [the synthesis speciosa] determines the subjects of these judgments as final subjects—concepts that can never be predicated of anything else. (412)

As Waxman also notes, insofar as it “effects a necessary correlation of each final subject [that is, subject categorically determined as always subject, never predicate], as given in a concept, to each of the spaces and times prediscursively present,” substance-accident is inseparable from existence-nonexistence.
And then (for the case of space), to satisfy the need for a “principle of order to determine for every final subject in space which others are adjacent, which are situated at a remove from it, and, in the case of the latter, which other final subjects (spaces) intervene,” the categories of cause-effect and possibility-impossibility are also needed (417). This might seem surprising at first, since we are concerned only with spaces and times at this point. But then Kant himself does say (at least for the case of time), apparently precisely as a premise in an argument for the “law of causality,” that “it is a necessary law of our sensibility, thus a formal condition of all perceptions, that the preceding time necessarily determines the following time” (A199/B244). In any case, for space the idea is that, given the undifferentiated character of the pure-formal manifold, how else is it indeed possible to represent a space A as determinately adjacent to another B, or at some determinate distance along some determinate route from C, than—construing adjacency in terms of reciprocal immediate causal relation—by means of a causal series connecting determinations predicated of those spaces as final subjects (and therefore predicated of them precisely as conceptualized by means of AUA)? Waxman works out the synthesis speciosa of the other categories in similar detail.

As should be clear, while this elevation of purely aesthetic to objective space and time adds a certain level of determinateness to the former, nothing in it reverses the original lack (in the case of space) of all “need to conform to the definitions, axioms, postulates, and theorems of Euclidean or any other geometry.” The upshot is a theory comparable in interest and originality to those of Leibniz and Newton, but without the Euclidean baggage typically associated with the Kantian view.

Readers may, of course, feel unease over the suggestion that our cognitive process might attach AUA directly to spaces and times (or to whatever in appearance we might suppose thereby determined as such), thereby converting them precisely into concepts—on the most basic level, into concepts of items simply as juxtaposed or successive/antecedent to others (411). But while there is, at least to my own mind, a more natural way of putting it, it seems to me that Waxman has made a solid case for a point of first importance. The crux is the need for a level of understanding that "cognizes" (independently of "syntheses of recognition") a manifold precisely as a manifold of spaces and times (and indeed as determinate spaces and times), as a precondition for the construction of concepts of anything conceivably occupying them. But what we cannot suppose toward this end is that we are simply given a manifold of items that are determinate spaces and times, together with the capacity for cognitive aiming precisely at them. Or, at least, so we cannot suppose, given the minimalistic picture of the Aesthetic that I (more or less, I think) share with Waxman.

Still it seems to me that we need something more, and can get it (more or less) in Waxman’s minimalistic terms. My concern is the notion of “synopsis.” Although the following suggestion employs an “act”-“object” model that, per-
haps even with heavy qualification, Waxman would not accept in this context, why not put things rather in the following terms? What is on the most basic level “given” is a manifold of affections, such that at least some of them, to have any bearing on cognition, need to get incorporated within a single state of a perceiver that can be said to have, as its own “object” (given the satisfaction of (b) and (c) within that state), a “field” of appearance within which objects might eventually be located. A further condition is then, of course, the capacity for cognitive aiming within that field, as a condition for any sort of understanding thereof. So, to put it in terms that seem to me more natural, what needs, in the first instance, to get converted, not literally into concepts but precisely into such instances of understanding, is just manifolds of such aiming. And I think we can make sense of this if we only accept the possibility of manifolds of synopses occurring within (what is for the perceiver) an all-encompassing instance of synopsis. What we would then need to recognize, at the most fundamental level of discursivity, is the conversion of instances of synopsis into what we might call instances of “thoughtful” synopsis. But then here I would add: once we put the notion of “synopsis” to this fuller use, it seems to me to amount in its own right to something whose a priori “form” might well be called a pure form of intuition—in at least one of the senses at work in the Aesthetic—and not just as one component in the tripartite structure articulated above. But then in turn: why not grant that it is now at least permissible, even if not required by resolution of the problem of the unity of sensibility, and without obviating the need for the sort of objective determination toward which chapter 15 is directed, to suppose that such form introduces at least some minimal element of determinateness into aesthetic space and time?

In any case, and needless to say, there remains much of significance in this book to which I have been unable to attend. No serious student of the first Critique should neglect it.

References


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